Recent literature on computational notions of fairness has been broadly divided into two distinct camps, supporting interventions that address either individual-based or group-based fairness. Rather than privilege a single de nition, we seek to resolve both within the particular domain of employment discrimination. To this end, we construct a dual labor market model composed of a Temporary Labor Market, in which rm strategies are constrained to ensure group-level fairness, and a Permanent Labor Market, in which individual worker fairness is guaranteed. We show that such restrictions on hiring practices induces an equilibrium that Paretodominates those arising from strategies that employ statistical discrimination or a "group-blind" criterion. Individual worker reputations produce externalities for collective reputation, generating a feedback loop termed a "self-ful lling prophecy. " Our model produces its own feedback loop, raising the collective reputation of an initially disadvantaged group via a fairness intervention that need not be permanent. Moreover, we show that, contrary to popular assumption, the asymmetric equilibria resulting from hiring practices that disregard group-fairness may be immovable without targeted intervention. e enduring nature of such equilibria that are both inequitable and Pareto ine cient suggest that fairness interventions are of critical importance in moving the labor market to be more socially just and e cient.
INTRODUCTION
Work in the growing eld of algorithmic fairness proposes interventions of discretion on algorithmic decision-makers when issues of bias and discrimination are potentially at stake. e literature is varied but may be broadly categorized as either proposing solutions that defend fairness at the individual level (similar individuals are treated similarly) [1] or at the group level (groups are awarded proportional representation) [2, 3] . is paper constructs Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for pro t or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the rst page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permi ed. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior speci c permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. FAT/ML '17, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada © 2017x ACM. 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn a model of discrimination in the labor market along with fairness constraints that address both notions of fairness.
As we focus on the particular domain of labor market dynamics, our paper draws upon an extensive literature in economics.
e theory of statistical discrimination, originally set forth in two seminar papers by Phelps [4] and Arrow [5] , explains group-unfair outcomes as the result of rational agent behaviors that lock a system into an unfavorable equilibrium. In the basic model, workers compete for a skilled job with wage w. Skill acquisition requires workers to expend an investment cost of c, which is distributed according to a function F . us, a worker's investment decision is an assessment of her expected wage gain compared with her cost of investment. Firms seek information about a worker's hidden ability level but can only base their hiring decisions on observable a ributes: her noisy investment signal and group membership. e rm's response to this informational asymmetry is to update its beliefs about a worker's quali cations by drawing on its prior for her group's ability levels. erefore, if a rm holds di erent priors for di erent groups, it will also set di erent hiring thresholds. Further, since these distinct thresholds are observed and internalized by workers, they adjust their own investment strategies accordinglyindividuals within the unfavored group will lower their investment levels, and individuals in the favored group will continue to invest at a high level. Notably, even when the distribution of costs F is the same for each group 1 , an asymmetric equilibrium can arise in which groups invest at di erent levels, further informing rms' distinct priors. In other words, rational workers and rms bestrespond in ways that exactly con rm the others' beliefs and strategies, and thus, the discriminatory outcome is "justi ed. " is equilibria perspective challenges our mission in designing constraints to ensure fairness. For one, given that statistical discrimination and machine learning in general rely on data that harbor historical inequalities, isolated algorithmic interventions that do not consider the dynamics of the particular system in which they are embedded will o en fall short of addressing the self-perpetuating nature of biases. We cannot look forward toward a future of fairness without rst looking backwards at the conditions that have caused such inequalities.
us if the observed outcomes themselves are trapped in a feedback loop, fairness constraints should aim to rst jolt the system out of its current steady-state, and second, launch it on a path towards a preferable equilibrium. As such, a successful approach must consider fairness in situ.
is paper presents a dynamic model that is domain-speci c and a fairness intervention that is system-wide.
In our model, workers invest in human capital, enter rst a Temporary Labor Market (TLM), and then transition into a Permanent Labor Market (PLM) 2 . We use this partition to impose a constraint on rms' hiring practices in the TLM that enforces group-fairness. However, the restriction need not apply in the PLM, and rms naturally select best-response hiring strategies that guarantee individual worker fairness. Our model of the labor market is reputationala worker carries an individual reputation, which is a history of her past job performances, and belongs to one of two groups that has a collective reputation, summarized by the proportion of workers in the group producing "good" outcomes.
Working within this model, we show that by imposing an outcomesbased fairness constraint on rms' hiring strategies in the TLM, the resulting steady-state equilibrium in the PLM is group-symmetric and Pareto-dominates the PLM asymmetric equilibria that arise due to either group-blind optimal hiring or statistical discriminatory hiring. Within this model, our fairness intervention is constructed to exploit the complementary nature of individual and collective reputations such that the system produces a feedback loop that incrementally addresses initial inequalities in group social standing. As such, our TLM fairness intervention is not permanentthe guarantee of group-level fairness gradually morphs into a guarantee of individual-level fairness as group equality is restored. is paper's application of notions of group-based and individual fairness to a reputational model of statistical discrimination in the labor market melds the perspectives and techniques of labor economics with the motivations and framework of algorithmic fairness. Our proposed fairness constraints address individual and group fairness in separate treatments in the labor market that are nonetheless linked via a complementarity feedback loop. us, these constraints are aimed at creating system-wide conditions of fairness that are self-sustaining. As algorithms are increasingly deployed to make employment-related decisions, we hope our work sheds a light on the equilibrium nature of discriminatory outcomes and may inform the design and implementation of fairness constraints.
In Section 2, we present our model of labor market dynamics and the imposed fairness constraint. Section 3 contains an overview of the equilibria results of the model under the fairness requirement along with a comparison against equilibria arising from two rational hiring strategies free from such a constraint. e paper ends with a re ection on the general equilibrium tendencies of discrimination and their implications on the design of fairness constraints. We also o er some comments on the dynamic feedback e ects that are inherent features of persistent inequalities and the challenges they issue upon future work in algorithmic fairness.
Related Work
Within the algorithmic fairness literature, Zemel et al. [7] address both group and individual notions of fairness by constructing a map of agent data to an intermediate layer of clusters that each preserve statistical parity (ensuring group fairness) while obfuscating protected a ributes. A second mapping to classi cation based on cluster assignments then allows "similar" agents to be treated similarly.
is dual-map approach corresponds to our TLM and PLM fairness constraints. Related work has sought distance metrics to guide the initial mapping [1] , but since criteria for similarity vary by domain, such general approaches o en face obstacles of application. We hope that our paper's concentrated treatment of dynamics in the labor market addresses this concern. We answer a call by Friedler et al. [8] to specify a particular world view of fairness within a domain and classi cation task. Our model starts with the important stance of inherent equality between groups. As such, any indications of di erence in group ability distribution because of observable investment decisions or outcomes is due to unequal societal standing, producing myriad secondary e ects of inequality, rather than fundamental di erences in the nature of the individuals. Following the vocabulary used in Friedler et al., our model of group di erences in the labor market subscribes to the axiomatic assumption of "We're all equal. "
MODEL
We disentangle the concerns of group-based and individual fairness by constructing a dual labor market that addresses each notion of fairness independently. A rm's hiring process in the Temporary Labor Market (TLM) will guarantee group-based fairness; the mechanisms of the Permanent Labor Market (PLM) will ensure individual fairness. While the labor market is divided as a whole, their dynamics are not separable-workers ow from the TLM to the PLM, wages are labor-market-wide, and individual worker reputations in the PLM produce externalities for the collective group reputations that play a key role in individual's pre-TLM investment decisions.
General Setup
Consider a society of n workers who pass through the labor market sequentially at times t = 0, 1, .... e labor markets maintain a constant relative size: m proportion of the workers reside in the TLM, and 1 − m reside in the PLM. Movement is governed by Poisson processes-workers immediately replace departing ones in the TLM, transition from the TLM to the PLM according to the parameter κ, and leave the PLM at rate λ. Each worker belongs to one of two groups µ ∈ {B,W } within which the distribution of individual abilities is identical, described by the CDF F (θ). Firms hire and pay workers based on expected performance, awarding wage w( t ) for a "good" worker, where t gives the proportion of "good" workers in the PLM at time t. is is formalized by assigning workers to either skilled or unskilled tasks with distinct wages.
us for simplicity, "bad" workers are also hired but are assigned to the unskilled task and paid a wage normalized to 0. e wage premium w( t ) is decreasing in t , since as the relative supply of "good" workers increases, imperfect worker substitutability lowers their marginal productivity, thus decreasing wage. We impose a minimum wagew such that lim t →∞ w( t ) = w and a maximum wagew such that lim t →0 w( t ) =w.
Temporary Labor Market
First, a worker i at time t chooses to invest in human capital η i > 0 according to the current wage premium w( t ) 3 and her personal cost function for investment, c π µ t ′ (θ i , η i ), which is a function of her individual ability θ i 4 , group µ "reputation, " π µ t ′ where t ′ represents the time interval [t − τ , t], and selected level of investment η i . e collective reputation gives the proportion of "good" workers of group µ in the interval t ′ = [t − τ , t], where the parameter τ controls the time-lag e ect of a group's previous generations' reputation on a member's investment cost in the present. c is decreasing in θ, increasing in η, and ∀π
. e incorporation of group membership into an individual's cost function is informed by the vast empirical literature that demonstrates the di erential externalities produced by groups of di erential social standing [9] .
Investment in human capital operates as an imperfect signal, and workers have a hidden true type, quali ed or unquali ed, ρ ∈ {Q, U } with proportionγ Q being quali ed, and 1−γ Q being unquali ed. For investment level η, P(Q |η i ) ≥ P(Q |η j ), ∀η i > η j . us, a rm's TLM hiring strategy is a mapping H T : R {B,W } → {0, 1} such that the decision for agent i is based only her observed investment level η i and group membership µ.
De nition 2.1 (Group Fairness).
A hiring strategy H is group-fair if and only if for all agents i, the event of i being hired is conditionally independent of her group-membership, and thus
Group-fair hiring results in employee representation that satises statistical parity. We impose this fairness constraint on hiring strategies in the TLM, requiring rms to move beyond "groupblind" practices.
Permanent Labor Market
Once hired, worker i exerts on-the-job e ort e ∈ {H , L}, which stochastically produces an observable outcome o ∈ {G, B} that impacts her individual reputation and thus future reward. e = L is free, but exerting e = H is costly with c(θ i , ρ) as a function of quali cation status and ability level. E ort exertion cost functions here are distinct from the previous investment cost functions-the former are pertinent to the PLM and di er by quali cation status, whereas the la er relate to the TLM and di er by group membership. E ort is more costly for unquali ed individuals and c(θ i , U ) ≥ c(θ i , Q), ∀θ, and high e ort increases the probability of a good outcome G.
us if p ρ,e gives the probability of achieving outcome G with quali cations ρ and e ort level e, we have the following inequalities
Since the e ect of quali cations on exerting high e ort is already incorporated in its cost, we write both quantities as p H .
A worker keeps the same TLM job until the Poisson process with parameter κ selects her to move into the PLM, where rms are able to observe her history of job outcomes, including her TLM performance. A worker i's time t history is h t i = (o i, 1 , o i, 2 , ..., o i,t −1 ), a sequence of outcomes that corresponds to her past performances. Firms are boundedly rational and distill a worker's past histories to her "individual reputation" Π t i , which gives the proportion of outcomes G ∈ h t i . A rm's PLM hiring strategy is a mapping H P : [0, 1] → {0, 1} such that the decision regarding agent i is solely a function of Π t i . Similar to the H T , the optimal H P is also based on a threshold strategy such that for a chosen reputation thresholdΠ t at time t, ∀i such that Π t i ≥Π t , H (i) = 1, and inversely, ∀i such that Π t i <Π t , H (i) = 0. Levin [10] also constructs a model of discrimination in which a worker's observed individual reputation is driven by e ort level exertions. But we depart from a binary worker's reputation signal and conceive of reputation as a history of previous outcomes.
RESULTS

Equilibrium Strategies and Steady-States
Due to feedbacks between individual and collective reputations, multiple equilibria exist. To focus on a particular equilibrium, we suppose that rms in the PLM prefer to only hire workers who consistently exert high e ort. We start by describing PLM strategies and then analyze rms' and workers' best responses together.
A worker in the PLM is both history-cognizant as well as futureanticipatory. Agent i's strategy is a selection of time, reputation, wage, and hiring threshold-dependent probabilities of e ort exertion e(Π t i ). e discount factor δ incorporates workers' presentbias as well as the possibility of exiting the market via the λ-rate Poisson process. Her exertion decisions are chosen according to the expected marginal reward for a G outcome over a B outcome at time t.
where
We simplify R(θ i , Π t i ,Π t , t ) to R ∞ t . Φ j describes the dynamics of agent i's individual reputation as a function of her e ort exertion probability at each possible previous level of reputation, e(Π j i ). e expectation is taken over wage paths w( t ), and e ort exertion is only warranted if
In the PLM, if rms wish to hire all and only workers who consistently exert high e ort, their equilibrium strategy is to select a reputation thresholdΠ t = p H * t − ∆(δ ) where ∆(δ ) > 0 is some small in magnitude function of the discount factor δ . Under the particular hiring strategy, there will be a steady-state wagew such that all workers with ability θ ρ > c −1 ρ (w) will exert e ort H even if their history has "fallen behind"Π t . Although immediate reward is not guaranteed, in the long-run, exertions of e ort will be rewarded.
However, in this setup in which employers observe reputations Π t i of outcomes up to t − 1, workers hold a rst-mover advantage.
A worker i with reputation Π t i − 1 t >Π t who has secured a job at time t may nd it pro table to exert e ort L given that she knows that she will be hired in the next round regardless of her round t outcome. us the optimal worker strategy entails exerting e ort in a manner that maintains a reputation exactly oscillating around the thresholdΠ t . In response, the rm will optimize its hiring thresholdĥ t = p H − ∆(δ ) by decreasing ∆ just enough to motivate consistent high e ort from these workers. As δ → 1, ∆ → 0, and Π t = p H such that workers always exert e ort if they can a ord to do so. All other workers exert low e ort in each round. us at any time t, given the rm's reputation thresholdΠ t , its equilibrium PLM hiring strategy H P is a mapping such that if and only if a worker i has reputation Π t i >Π t , H P (i) = 1, else H P (i) = 0. Suppose γ Q gives the proportion of candidates who are qualied, leaving 1 − γ Q who are unquali ed. en the proportion of workers in the PLM who produce good outcomes follows the recursive model
To determine wage dynamics, we consult TLM strategies before proceeding to the full equilibrium description. Since a TLM rm prefers high-ability candidates, optimal hiring follows a threshold strategy: Given a hiring thresholdη, ∀i such that η i ≥η, H T (i) = 1, and inversely, ∀i such that η i <η, H T (i) = 0.
However, since rms must abide by the group fairness hiring rule, if a rm aims to hire a fraction ℓ of all workers, investment thresholds will be implicitly de ned and group-speci c.
P
1. Taken together, rms' equilibrium hiring strategies for the TLM and PLM, H T and H P , both satisfy group fairness.
Given the time t TLM investment thresholdη, all workers i with c π µ t ′ (θ i ,η) ≤ w( t ) will invest at exactly the level η i =η and be successfully hired, while all other workers will invest at level η i = 0 and fail to qualify for skilled job positions in the TLM.
Once in the TLM, workers know that their future PLM opportunities will depend on their observable outcome in the TLM, and as such they exert e ort in a one-shot game. Interestingly, the one-shot game produces a TLM equilibrium that is equivalent to its PLM counterpart, and t , the proportion of workers producing good outcomes in the TLM, follows the structure of (3) and (4). is is because a single-shot game imposes the same type of pressure as does the stringent threshold history hiring strategy in the PLM. In both, every outcome "counts. "
Having elaborated upon the dynamics of both the TLM and PLM, we incorporate worker movement and combine the results to obtain a recursive relationship that governs the equilibrium path of workers' performance results, sequence of { t } ∞ 0 , from an initial wage w 0 . Note that the multiplicity of possible rm hiring strategies produces a multiplicity of equilibrium paths, but given that rms are willing to hire only and all workers who consistently exert high e ort, rm and worker equilibrium strategies are as previously described, and there exists a unique equilibrium path. 
Under the above conditions, the proportion of workers producing good outcomes at time t follows the recursive relationship
) e proportion t is equal for each group B and W , satisfying groupfairness throughout the labor market.
Under the TLM fairness constraint, groups with unequal initial social standing will gradually approach the same reputation level according to time-lag τ . If the TLM fairness intervention occurs at t = t 1 , and initially π B , the function π B t ′ where
is strictly increasing for all t > t 1 until some time T when π B T = π W T . e "self-con rming" loop is now co-opted for group B's reputation improvement-collective reputation produces a positive externality, lowering individual group members' cost functions, thus improving investment conditions for future workers, further raising individual and group reputation.
We next compare this equilibrium under the TLM group-level fairness constraint with equilibria under other rational hiring strategies that are not bound by any notions of fairness and show that under weak conditions, the fairness equilibrium is Pareto-dominant.
Comparative Statics with Unconstrained Hiring Strategies
Consider a TLM hiring strategy that is individual-based, operating under a pure equal-treatment philosophy. A rm hires a proportion q of workers by se ing an investment level η de ned implicitly as
where σ B and 1 − σ B give the proportion of individuals in groups B and W respectively and the function c µ (θ) gives the group µ investment level function. Writing c −1 µ (η) = θ µ for µ ∈ {B,W }, these TLM ability thresholds are ranked with respect to the ability threshold under the fairness constraint θ as θ W < θ < θ B .
In the PLM, the steady-state wagew enforces thresholds c −1 5 , then asymmetric equilibria in which group reputations π µ di er may arise. Firms' TLM hiring strategies inequitably bound the proportion of high-ability workers in group B who are eligible to compete for jobs in the PLM, thus maintaining the reputation gap and di erences in group investment costs, producing the "self-con rming" equilibrium e ect.
Further, since 1 − F ( θ ρ ) < 1 − F f ( θ ρ ) where F and F f are the ability CDFs under the "group-blind" and fair regime respectively, rms that demand more workers strictly prefer the equilibria under the fairness constraint. is is because the e ective higher ability threshold for group B under this "group-blind" TLM strategy is ine cient, leaving behind an untapped resource of skilled and quali ed individuals who would have otherwise been hired in the PLM. Even the hired workers in group W who are not hired in the fair regime do not fare be er, since all such workers have ability level lower than the PLM reputation threshold and are not hired at equilibrium anyway.
Firms may also select hiring strategies that use statistical discrimination, in which priors regarding a worker's observable attributes (such as group membership) are used to infer a particular individual's hidden a ributes. However, when groups face di ering underlying investment cost functions, rms that statistically discriminate may push the system toward Pareto-dominated equilibria similar in kind to the asymmetric equilibria in the "groupblind" case.
In particular, if TLM rms hold priors ξ B and ξ W about the two groups' capabilities, upon observing an agent's group membership µ and investment level , they will update their beliefs according to:
where p S ( ) and p U ( ) gives the probability of a skilled and unskilled worker having investment level respectively. If ξ W > ξ B , then P(S |W , ) > P(S |B, ), and the groups face di erent incentive compatibility constraints. As Coate & Loury [11] show, self-con rming asymmetric equilibria also exist under this regime, and lower investment levels within the group with lower social standing are justi ed by rms' more stringent hiring standards. ese TLM choices have rami cations in the PLM that mirror the Pareto-dominated results under "group-blind" hiring.
DISCUSSION
Given the speci c nature of demands in fairness, domain-speci c approaches lend themselves to be er modeling of the impact an intervention can make on a particular ecosystem. Describing unfair outcomes in employment as caused by rational agent bestresponse strategies suggests that the eld of algorithmic fairness should consider the labor market's inherent dynamic se ing in its approach to potential interventions. Fairness constraints that are conceived as isolated procedural checks have a limited capacity to install system-wide fairness that may be self-sustained and longlasting. e problem of fairness is fundamentally tied to historicity. Within all societal domains in which fairness is an issue, past and current social relations di erentially impact subjects, producing distinct sets of resources, options, and opportunities that continue to mark agents' choices and outcomes today. is fact presents a challenge for the standard learning theory formulation of the problem in which agent a ributes are treated as a priori givens rather than themselves the products of a lineage of previous social choices and conditions. A dynamic model recognizes the powerful ripple e ect of the past and calls for a fairness intervention that carries momentum into the future.
e labor market as a source of economic opportunity is ripe with positive externalities and is thus an ideal se ing for a notion of fairness that is oriented toward a future beyond the short timeline of rm hiring cycles. We argue that fairness conceived in this way is a project that aims to achieve group egalitarianism-an ambition that is not only a worthy goal in itself but one that we show is also socially optimal.
Our model of individual reputations as a sequence of previous outcomes in the PLM ts within the hiring process regime today, in which employers have increased access to worker data. Since algorithms will be largely responsible for making sense of this individual historical data, future work should consider interventions that are able to si through a worker's historical data and determine whether a group-based fairness constraint, such as the one considered in this paper in the TLM, should be imposed, or whether a PLM individual-based hiring decision will su ce. Beyond serving e ciency, such practices should protect fairness.
e entry of algorithms into hiring must grapple with a long tradition of explicit and implicit human biases that have rendered the labor market prone to discriminatory practices. We hope that this work can suggest ways that algorithmic fairness interventions can shi hiring strategies towards a be er, fairer future.
